Abstract-This research studies defense strategies of an interdependent system in the face of rational attacks. We propose a sequential game between an attacker and a defender for an interdependent System of Systems (SoS) to explore the effect of interdependency on an optimal defense strategy. We develop an algorithm of backward induction to obtain the Nash equilibrium of the game. The attacker is the first mover as he applies an attack strategy on constituent systems that maximizes his utility. The defender observes and responds by a defense strategy that maximizes her utility. Both players' utilities are expressed as the difference between a player's reward due to SoS functionality (dysfunctionality) and the cost of the action. The sensitivity analysis compares the effects of different parameters on the attacker's and defender's strategies such as the effectiveness of defense (attack), the unit cost of defense (attack) and the interdependency level of constituent systems.
I. INTRODUCTION
Infrastructures are critical to the national economy and security. However, how to create a robust and resilient defense strategy for infrastructures is a challenging task. It is because the infrastructure defense strategy needs to consider not only the interdependency between infrastructures but also the attacker's adaptive strategies. This paper proposes a sequential game model between a defender and an attacker to study the optimal defense strategy of interdependent infrastructures.
The interdependent infrastructures can be treated as a System of Systems (SoS). The effective defense of an SoS is largely dependent on both the systems' interdependency and adversary's attack strategy. The failure of one system affects the functionality of other dependent systems, thereby the whole SoS. A sequential game between a defender and an attacker on an SoS is proposed. The backward induction is used to determine the pure strategy subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. This paper will investigate the interaction between a defender and an attacker in an interdependent SoS; and explore the effect of interdependency on defense and attack strategies at Nash equilibrium (NE).
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section II briefly describes related work and places the present work in a broad context. Section III defines the interdependency within an SoS. Section IV presents a sequential game model between a defender and an attacker with embedded interdependency between systems. Section V shows the numerical solution of the game based on low and high interdependency within the SoS. Section VI shows an application of the proposed game model to a series of industry sectors. Section VII concludes the paper.
II. RELATED WORKS
The research on security of infrastructures has achieved accumulative progress over recent decades. In the field of interdependency of infrastructures, [1] defined four categories of infrastructure interdependency, namely: physical, cyber, geographic, and logical. Physical interdependency occurs when the condition of each infrastructure is dependent on the material output(s) of the other. Cyber interdependency occurs when the condition of an infrastructure depends on information transmitted through communication networks. Infrastructures are geographically interdependent by means of their nearness in distance. Two infrastructures are logically interdependent by a mechanism that is neither physical, geographical nor cyber, which occurs mostly because of human decisions.
An extensive analysis of interdependency modeling approaches that are empirical based [2] , agent based [3] , system dynamics based [4] , economic theory based [5] , and graph theory based [6] can be found at [7] . For example, the energy sector (oil, gas and electricity) is the most critical example of infrastructure interdependency due to the role it plays in ensuring all the other infrastructures -water, waste, transportation, information and communications network function effectively. As shown in [8] , most system structures are studied as serial or parallel. Networks represented as node-arc graphs become a widely used approach recently. In the field of game theory on infrastructure protection, various game models, typically between two players, have been developed, such as multiple-level simultaneous games on petroleum reserves [9] , sequential games for defending transportation network [10] , and multiple-player simultaneous games for investments in security measures along the food supply chain [11] . However, not much research have been done on the joint field of game-theoretic analysis and system interdependency. A few related work can be found in [8] , which summarizes major defense and attack models including game-theoretic approach before 2012. This paper contributes by formulating a sequential game model that not only considers the rationality of attacker but also the interdependency in the SoS, analyzing the effect of interdependency level to defender's and attacker's utilities, and demonstrating the model with real data. Here, defense means the security efforts provided by service providers such as government and business. Attack indicates the adversary's efforts on intentional breakdown and disruption of infrastructures' operations.
III. THE SYSTEM INTERDEPENDENCY
The interdependency between individual systems have been studied in different approaches, such the Leontief input-output model [5] , and the pairwise and aggregate failure correlation functions [12] . Consider a system of systems (SoS) consisting of n systems. We define the system interdependency S in an SoS as follows.
where s ij denotes the failure probability of constituent system i when the constituent system j is failed. A constituent system i is a high-interdependent system if
and a low-interdependent system otherwise. In other words, the level of interdependency of a constituent system is evaluated by the failure probability of either any other systems' failure affecting its functionality or its failure affecting other systems.
IV. THE SEQUENTIAL GAME MODEL
We propose a sequential game and investigate gametheoretic defense strategies in interdependent infrastructures in the face of rational attacks. The attacker launches attack on an SoS with information of system interdependency and the aim of maximizing his utility. Then the defender determines defense efforts to maximize her utility after observing the attacker's actions as shown in Figure 1 . The defender's utility is evaluated by the reward from system functioning and the defense cost. The defender's reward depends on both the system interdependency and the interaction with attacker. Specifically, the multiplication of system survival probability and defender's winning probability represents the defender's reward.
In a game of complete information, the attacker's and defender's objective functions are shown in Equations 2 and 3.
where f (a, d) is a 1 × n row vector of defender's winning probability as a function of defense and attack efforts. For example, using a contest success function [13] ,
, where a i and d i are the attack and defense efforts on the constituent system i, i = 1, 2, · · · , n. The system dysfunctionality g(S, a) is jointly determined by the system interdependency S, as defined in Equation 1; and the attack effort a. Here, we define g(S, a) = (I − S) −1 a, analogous to the Leontief Input-Output model [5] when the SoS is subject to attack, a, where a = {a 1 , a 2 , · · · , a n } T is a column vector and I is an n × n identity matrix. The notation 
and S is defined as shown in Equation 1
; α i , and β i , i = 1, · · · , n are i th system defense and attack effectiveness, respectively.
V. MODEL SOLUTION
The pure strategy subgame Nash equilibrium is found using backward induction. We first present the analytical solution of defender's best response, then numerically find the Nash equilibrium solution
A. The Defender's Best Response
Revisit the SoS dysfunctionality g(S, a) = (I −S) −1 a. If I − S satisfies Hawkins-Simon condition [14] , it is non-singular. Then the defender's best responsed can be obtained as follows.
Proposition 1. The defender's best response in the sequential game shown in Equations 4 and 5 is given byd
, where i, j = 1, 2, · · · , n. Let
B. Numerical Illustration of Game Solutions
We use backward induction to numerically solve the sequential game in Equations 4 and 5. The algorithm of finding approximate Nash equilibria is described as following steps.
(1) Initialize all parameters: S, α k , β k , c dk , and c ak , for
The effect of interdependency level within the SoS to defense and attack strategies are studied by comparing low-interdependent and high-interdependent cases.
1) Low interdependency Case:
A low-interdependent SoS is a system with relatively low interdependency between its constituent systems, for example, a low interdependency matrix S L as follows.
Moreover, within the SoS, System 2 is a highinterdependent constituent system, and System 3 is a low-interdependent system because the failure of System 2 leads to 10% dysfunctional of both Systems 1 and 3, and the failure of System 1 will make System 2 10% dysfunctional. At the baseline values, i.e., α 1 Fusion (FUSION) relatively high of 0.21. As the defense effectiveness on System 3, α 3 increases, the defense effort on System 3 increases, and that on the other two systems decreases, and the defender's utility increases. As the unit defense cost on System 1, c d1 increases, the defense effort on System 1 decreases and that on the other two systems maintain at a relatively high level. 
2) High interdependency Case:
On the other hand, a high-interdependent system S H is one with relatively high interdependency between its constituent systems such that failure of one of its constituent systems may very likely lead to failures of other constituent systems, e.g., cascading failures. Consider the following highinterdependent SoS. 
The solution shows that the attacker does not attack the lowinterdependent constituent System 3; the attacker is deterred with a utility of 0.055 while the defender's is relatively high of 0.21. Comparing the high and low interdependency cases, with all other parameters the same, the attacker received lower utility in attacking low-interdependent SoS.
3) The effect of interdependency on defense strategy: The NE solutions shown in Figures 2 and 3 indicate that the defender achieves relatively high utility in lowinterdependent SoS. Meanwhile the attacker obtains relatively high utility in high-interdependent SoS.
VI. CASE STUDY
Considering the interdependency between industry sectors based on the economic input-output data in year 
[15]
, we study the game-theoretic defense strategy for high-and low-interdependent infrastructures.
A. The high-interdependent infrastructures
The high-interdependent systems will include sectors of manufacturing, agriculture, and transportation. The interdependency matrix is shown as follows. We notice that the manufacturing is the highinterdependent sector, and the transportation is the lowinterdependent sector within the group of these three sectors. The defense (attack) effort, and defender's (attacker's) utility at NE with respect to different parameters are explored in Figure 4 . Figure 4 (a) shows that as the unit cost of defense in the manufacturing sector c d1 increases, the defense effort in the manufacturing sector decreases; the attack effort in the manufacturing sector will decrease when c d1 becomes relatively large; and the attacker's utility increases. Figure 4(b) shows that when the unit cost of attack in the manufacturing sector increases, the attack effort in the manufacturing sector decreases and the attacker's utility decreases. Figure 4(c) shows that as the effectiveness of defense in the transportation sector increases, the defense effort in that sector increases until α 3 ≥ 0.36, after which the attacker is fully deterred in all of the sectors. Figure 4(d) shows that as the effectiveness of attack in the manufacturing sector increases, the attacker increases attack effort in the manufacturing sector. While the defender maintains a relatively high level of defense effort in each sector. The attacker can obtain a higher level of utility than the defender because of the high interdependence between all of the sectors. 
sector increases, the defense increases in the manufacturing sector and decreases in the transportation (lowinterdependent) sector. The defender achieves a relatively high (comparing to the attacker) utility increasingly. However, the attacker receives a relatively low utility comparing to the sensitivity of α 3 in Figure 4 (c). In other words, increasing the defense effectiveness in a high-interdependent infrastructure can more effectively deter attack than in a low-interdependent infrastructure. Figure 4 (f) shows that as the effectiveness of attack in the transportation sector increases, the attacker increases attack efforts in the transportation sector and drops attack efforts in the agriculture sector because with the high interdependency, attacking the manufacturing sector gives cost-effective reward to the attacker and there is no need to attack the agriculture sector.
B. The low-interdependent infrastructures
The low-interdependent systems will include three infrastructure sectors: sectors of retail & trade, other services except government, and health & education. The interdependency matrix between three sectors is given by 
unit cost of defense on the retail & trade sector c d1 increases, the defense effort in the retail & trade sector decreases; the attack effort in the sector will first increase then decrease and remain at a relatively low level; and the attacker's utility increases but still less than the defender's utility if c d1 is not too large because of the low interdependency effect. Figure 5(b) shows that when the unit cost of attack in the retail & trade sector increases, the attack effort in the sector decreases and the attacker's utility decreases. Figure 5 (c) shows that as the effectiveness of defense in the health & education sector increases, the defense effort in that sector increases and the attack effort in that sector decreases. shows that as the effectiveness of attack in the transportation sector increases, the attacker exert higher level of attack and receives lower utility, comparing to the high-interdependent case shown in Figure 4 (f).
Comparing the NE strategies in low-and highinterdependent infrastructures as shown in Figures 4 and 5, we have the following findings.
• As the defense effectiveness α k in sector k (k = 1, ..., n) increases, the defender's utility U * d increases for high (S H ) and low (S L ) interdependent infrastructures, and
• The defender can obtain higher utility in the lowinterdependent SoS than the high one even the defense efforts on both SoS are the same.
• The attack level in the high-interdependent sector in the high-interdependent SoS (S H ) is higher than that in the low-interdependent one (S L ); and the attacker received higher utility in the highinterdependent SoS than the low one.
Proposition 2. A low-interdependent SoS is preferred for defense than a high-interdependent one. A highly interdependent constituent system is preferred for defense (attack) unless its defense (attack) cost or effectiveness affects her (his) utility more than the interdependency does.
It is observed that the defender prefers a lowinterdependent system because a low defense effort on the system can minimize the impact of an attack and result in a higher utility, but the attacker prefers a highinterdependent system because a low level of attack effort can result in a cascading failure of the highinterdependent system. However, if it is unrewarding for the attacker to choose a high-interdependent system, he will withdraw, likewise the defender in a lowinterdependent system. The model is very sensitive to the parameter range of values chosen for defense effectiveness, attack effectiveness and the unit cost of defense and attack.
As the effectiveness of defense on a constituent system increases, the defender increases defense effort on that constituent system and this causes the attacker to be deterred from attacking that constituent system. The attacker also attacks the high-interdependent system at a higher attack level than the low-interdependent system. Ideally, the defender and attacker would act on a high-interdependent constituent system, but when the effect of defense/attack effectiveness (or cost) on a relatively low-interdependent constituent system outperforms its interdependent effect, the defender defends and the attacker attacks the relatively low-interdependent constituent system. Furthermore, as the unit cost of defense on a constituent system increases, the attacker increases attack on this constituent system. The defender in return decreases defense on this constituent system but maintains a high defense level on the other constituent systems. On the other hand, as the unit cost of attack on a constituent system increases, the attacker decreases attack on this constituent system and increases attack on the other relatively high-interdependent systems. In return, the defender takes advantage of the attacker's action by maintaining a higher defense level on the constituent system with increasing unit cost of attack. This indicates that both players are sensitive to a high cost of action.
VII. CONCLUSION
The paper proposes a game-theoretic framework for defense strategies on interdependent SoS between a defender and an attacker. The interdependency within an SoS is defined analogous to a Leontief-based inputoutput model. The defender's best response is derived. The pure strategy subgame perfect Nash equilibrium is obtained via backward induction. The NE sensitivity analysis shows that the defender prefers a lowinterdependent system, and the attacker prefers a highinterdependent system because a low level of attack effort may result in a cascading failure of the highinterdependent system. We also found that when the effect of defense effectiveness or cost on a constituent system outperforms its interdependent effect, the defender defends and the attacker attacks a relatively lowinterdependent system. Furthermore, the defense (attack) on high-interdependent system within an SoS can increase the defender's (attacker's) utility more than the actions on a low-interdependent constituent system. The conclusion provides insights for the security design of SoS. For the future work, we think about defense strategies on high-dimension interdependent systems, problems with multiple players, and incomplete information.
